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The LCROSS (Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite) mission was conceived
as a low-cost means of determining the nature of hydrogen concentrated at the polar regions
of the moon. Co-manifested for launch with LRO (Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter),
LCROSS guided its spent Centaur upper stage into the Cabeus crater as a kinetic impactor,
and observed the impact flash and resulting debris plume for signs of water and other
compounds from a Shepherding Spacecraft. Led by NASA Ames Research Center, LCROSS
flight operations spanned 112 days, from June 18 through October 9, 2009. This paper
summarizes the experiences from the LCROSS flight, highlights the challenges faced during
the mission, and examines the reasons for its ultimate success.
I. Introduction
T
HE LCROSS (Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite) mission was conceived as a low-cost means of
determining the nature of hydrogen detected at the polar regions of the moon 1 . The mission presented several
inherent challenges – planning for and achieving a precise impact at a lunar pole, guiding a Centaur upper stage far
beyond its operational lifetime, co-launching as a secondary payload with the LRO spacecraft 2 , and preparing for
and operating such a mission under a highly constrained budget and short development cycle. Beyond these, the
flight itself presented other hurdles in the path to success, including several anomalies, one of which was nearly
mission catastrophic.
The remainder of Section I provides the reader with background on the LCROSS project and components.
Section II provides an overview of the flight mission. The remaining sections describe specific challenges
encountered in planning and executing the mission and how they were overcome. The paper concludes by
highlighting the key factors for the mission’s success.
A. The Project
Managed, partially developed, and operated from NASA Ames Research Center (ARC), LCROSS was selected
under the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate’s (ESMD’s) Lunar Precursor Robotic Program (LPRP) as a
secondary payload manifested with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), under a $79 million cost cap 3 .
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LCROSS was designated as a Class D mission, indicating NASA’s willingness to accept greater levels of
programmatic and operational risk.
Rather than incur the high cost and mission complexity associated with landing at a lunar pole, LCROSS
precisely guided its Centaur Earth Departure Upper Stage (EDUS) to a lunar target as a kinetic impactor to raise a
plume of polar regolith from the surface. After releasing the Centaur, the guiding Shepherding Spacecraft (S-S/C)
employed a suite of nine science instruments to analyze the impact flash and plume materials at close range. Earth-
based and orbiting assets, including LRO and the Hubble Space Telescope, acted in a supporting role for impact
observations.
The LCROSS project remained on-budget and on-schedule, despite many programmatic and technical
challenges. LCROSS launched with LRO on June 18, 2009, and on October 9, 2009, after 112 days in flight, the
LCROSS team successfully delivered both the Centaur and S-S/C on-target within the Cabeus crater and collected
extensive data from all instruments during and after the Centaur impact. After one month of post-impact analysis,
the LCROSS science team announced the positive identification of water on the floor of Cabeus.
B. The Shepherding Spacecraft
In a novel design simplification, the
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via two omnidirectional antennas and two medium-gain antennas (20 deg half-angle). An S-band transponder
enabled downlink at data rates up to 1 Mbps and uplink at 4 kbps. Following launch and LRO separation, attitude
control was passed from the Centaur to the S-S/C. The attitude control system (ACS) provided three-axis control
using an inertial reference unit (IRU; no accelerometers), a star tracker, coarse sun sensors for emergency automated
sun-relative attitude capture and tracking, and a set of eight monopropellant 5 N thrusters. Two additional 22 N
thrusters provided orbit maneuvering capability. The ACS featured twelve control mode/submode combinations, six
tailored for specific operations while attached to the Centaur, and a second set for use after Centaur separation. The
LCROSS propellant tank contained just over 305 kg of hydrazine for both attitude control and orbit maneuvering.
The LCROSS power system featured a 653 W solar array and four 20 A-h batteries. LCROSS performed thermal
control using a combination of resistive heaters, passive radiators, and multi-layer insulation.
C. Science Instrument Payload
The LCROSS science payload, developed at NASA ARC, combined processing and control electronics (Data
Handling Unit, or DHU) with nine instruments to aid in water detection 5 : a UV/visible light camera (VIS), two near-
infrared cameras (NIR 1 and 2), two mid-infrared cameras (MIR 1 and 2), a UV/visible light spectrometer (VSP),
two near-infrared spectrometers (NSP), and a total luminescence photometer (TLP). The DHU, all instruments, and
optics were COTS products or incrementally adapted from COTS products under a $2.5 million budget. Eight of
nine instruments were co-aligned along the S-S/C longitudinal axis and provided nadir-pointed sensing during the
Centaur impact event. One of two near-infrared spectrometers was side-pointed to provide spectra of sunlit material
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rising in the Centaur ejecta plume. A spring-loaded cover protected the nadir-looking instruments from direct sun
exposure during launch and through the early part of the mission.
D. The Centaur
The Centaur Earth Departure Upper Stage (EDUS), developed by United Launch Alliance, utilized two
independent propulsion systems. A cryogenic liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen system feeding the Centaur main
engine boosted LCROSS and LRO into Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) and performed Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI). A
separate hydrazine-based propulsion system enabled attitude control until handover to the LCROSS S-S/C. Onboard
processing controlled all Centaur maneuvering, initiated the LRO separation, and issued discrete commands that
triggered LCROSS activation. A post-TLI command sequence was designed to deplete most propellants from both
systems before control handover to LCROSS. The only significant physical modification of the LCROSS Centaur
was in the application of white paint to aid in thermal balancing of the empty stage during the mission. The Centaur
mass was approximately 2400 kg at impact. See Ref. 6 for a detailed treatment of LCROSS Centaur operations.
E. Mission Operations
LCROSS mission operations were conducted primarily at NASA ARC from a seven-seat Mission Operations
Control Room, a Mission Support Room for planning and off-line analysis, and a Science Operations Center. The
ARC team was supported by several remote operations facilities and personnel at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(navigation and link scheduling), NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (maneuver design support) and two Northrop
Grumman sectors (real-time and off-line engineering support). The flight team was divided into two shifts of real-
time spacecraft support, and another team devoted mainly to maneuver design, communications scheduling, and
engineering analysis. For details on the LCROSS flight team, please consult Tompkins et al. (Ref. 7).
LCROSS utilized the NASA/JPL Deep Space Network for space-ground communications. Uplink
communications were exclusively via 34 m antennas. Downlink occurred primarily through 34 m antennas, but also
through 70 m antennas (for high-rate science downlink applications) and the 26 m antenna at Canberra (for initial
acquisition). At the time of launch, the Madrid 70 m antenna (DSS-63) was down for upgrades, but did serve in an
engineering test capacity to support several events. Details on communications performance appear in Ref. 8.
II. Summary of Mission Events
The LCROSS mission was focused on achieving a precise, high-energy Centaur impact within a lunar polar
crater, and on observing the impact and resulting ejecta plume from the S-S/C, other orbiting spacecraft, and Earth-
based observatories. To achieve the desired impact geometry, LCROSS performed a lunar gravity assist to transfer
from its trans-lunar orbit to a Lunar Gravity Assist Lunar Return Orbit (LGALRO), an elliptical, Earth-centered
orbit of roughly lunar semi-major axis, but inclined steeply with respect to the lunar orbit plane. Performing a series
of trajectory correction maneuvers (TCM’s) with the Centaur impactor still attached, the S-S/C gradually refined the
trajectory to hit the designated target. Following three revolutions of the Earth, the LCROSS and lunar orbits re-
intersected. Less than ten hours before impact, the S-S/C released the Centaur. Soon afterward, a braking maneuver
induced a delay between the Centaur and S-S/C impacts, allowing the S-S/C to capture and transmit data from the
Centaur impact event for four minutes before creating a secondary impact plume nearby. This was the primary
LCROSS science operation. However, over the mission, the payload was activated eight additional times to collect
engineering and instrument calibration data, and another five times to manage instrument command sequences.
The LCROSS mission can be described as a sequence of four operational phases: Launch (liftoff to S-S/C
activation), Transfer (activation to lunar gravity assist), Cruise (gravity assist through TCM 8), and Final Targeting
and Impact (TCM 8 through S-S/C impact). This section reviews each of these mission phases.
A. Launch Phase
LCROSS and LRO launched on June 18, 2009 at 21:32 UTC aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle in the 401
configuration (4-meter fairing, no solid rocket boosters, single-engine Centaur). After achieving low-Earth orbit, the
Centaur performed a 23 minute coast, and then re-ignited to perform the trans-lunar injection (TLI) burn for both
LCROSS and LRO. Just under 3 minutes after TLI, the Centaur separated from LRO and subsequently performed a
collision and contamination avoidance maneuver. Having delivered LRO, the Centaur performed a series of
additional blowdown maneuvers totaling approximately 31 m/s to place LCROSS closer to its desired transfer orbit.
To minimize the residual propellant species aboard the Centaur at lunar impact (potential contaminants of water
measurements), the Centaur next performed a sequence of propellant depletion maneuvers with both cryogenic and
hydrazine-based reaction control systems.
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LCROSS launched powered off (see Section IV.A). Roughly 30 minutes after LRO separation, the Centaur
initiated spacecraft activation via a series of six discrete commands, issued over 14 seconds, to trigger primary or
redundant stages of the power-up. These included connecting batteries and solar array safely to the power bus;
booting the spacecraft processor; initiating active thermal control; powering the spacecraft transponder to initiate
telemetry downlink; and opening a latch valve to fill propellant lines. Importantly, these first six discrete commands
left LCROSS under Centaur attitude control. As the S-S/C proceeded with activation, the Centaur oriented the
LCROSS solar array toward the sun to maintain power and thermal control, and continued venting propellants.
Meanwhile, with the spacecraft avionics and transponder activated, the mission operations team began a basic
spacecraft checkout (telemetry analysis, commanding, downlink rate changes, basic configuration setup). Triggered
by the depletion of Centaur propellants (between 88 and 105 minutes after discrete 1), the Centaur issued a final
discrete command to cede attitude control to the S-S/C. This final command prompted the S-S/C to enter Sun Point
Mode, an attitude control mode that pointed the S-S/C solar array toward the sun (enforcing benign power and
thermal conditions) and maintained a 0.1 deg/s rate about the solar array normal axis (S-S/C pitch axis).
The Centaur remained active for hours after handover to transmit Centaur telemetry, including tank pressures
and temperatures, to aid in the estimation of remaining Centaur propellant.
B. Transfer Phase
Beginning at attitude control handover, Transfer Phase spanned the four days required to transit from the Earth
to the moon, including the lunar gravity assist. The principal goals of Transfer Phase were to confirm spacecraft
health, to refine the trajectory for the lunar encounter, and to perform a number of payload calibrations. Per plan,
Transfer Phase was conducted under nearly 24-hour communications coverage by the DSN. The fast operational
pace prompted a 24-hour staffing schedule utilizing two overlapping 13-hour fully staffed shifts.
Immediately after handover, the flight Table 1. Summary of Delta-V Maneuvers. TCM 1 and Sa were
team configured LCROSS for Cruise State, 	 “deterministic” burns required even under ideal conditions.
including a transition from Sun Point Mode to
Stellar Inertial Mode, allowing LCROSS to be
oriented to an inertially-fixed, sun-pointed,
ecliptic-normal attitude. The flight team also
continued spacecraft checkout, with
transitions to all ACS attached control modes,
performance of several small (< 15 deg) slew
maneuvers, and a small delta-v maneuver
(this and all other delta-v maneuvers are
summarized in Table 1). A Centaur gas leak
(section V.A) and a number of spacecraft
anomalies (sections V.B and V.C) were
discovered during checkout.
During Transfer Phase, the flight team
performed a first TCM 25 hours after LRO
se aration to correct for Centaur deliveryp
errors and to target Lunar Swingby orbit conditions. Two additional TCM’s were performed, 49 and 84 hours after
LRO separation, to correct errors induced by earlier burns. The LCROSS spacecraft behaved nominally during all
three maneuvers, putting the spacecraft on target for the Lunar Swingby event.
Four hours after TCM 1, the payload was powered-up in flight for the first time in what was termed
“Quicklook”. Performing a short diagnostic with each instrument (save the total luminescence photometer, which
was not powered-up), the Payload Engineer and Science Team determined that the payload was behaving nominally.
Just over five hours after TCM 3, the team performed a second payload activity, “Star Field Calibration”, during
which the payload instrument cover was opened, and images were taken of a known star field. From these
measurements, the Science Team estimated camera alignment offsets with respect to the star tracker reference
frame. These offsets closely matched pre-launch estimates and consequently the original offsets were used as the
basis for Lunar Swingby planning.
The culmination of Transfer Phase was the lunar gravity assist event on Day 5, called “Lunar Swingby”. The
goals of Lunar Swingby were twofold: first, to efficiently transfer the LCROSS spacecraft into its LGALRO cruise
trajectory; second, to take advantage of the only close approach to the moon (save impact) to gather higher-
resolution science measurements of the lunar surface and limbs for calibration purposes. Because of its focus on
science operations, similar operational structure, use of a 70 m DSN antenna at a 1 Mbps downlink rate, and time-
Maneuver Start UTC Duration (s) Magnitude (m/s)
DV Test 0.210
TCM 1 19 June 2009 23:15 579.6 8.060
TCM 2 20 June 2009 20:16 112.6 1.502
TCM 3 22 June 2009 10:30 64.0 0.862
TCM 4a cancelled -- --
TCM 4b cancelled -- --
TCM 5a 21 July 2009 13:00 1790.0 21.124
TCM 5b cancelled -- --
TCM 5c cancelled -- --
TCM 6 cancelled -- --
TCM 7 5 Sep 2009 11:30 39.4 0.324
TCM 8 30 Sep 2009 15:00 45.8 0.351
TCM 9 6 Oct 2009 00:00 7.6 0.055
TCM 10 cancelled -- --
Separation 9 Oct 2009 01:50 0.0 0.154
Braking
Burn
9 Oct 2009 02:30 240.0 9.030
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critical nature, the event also served as a dress rehearsal for the impact event. In practice, Lunar Swingby partially
overlapped operations supporting LRO’s mission-critical lunar orbit insertion (LOI) burn. This introduced
complexities to the communications link schedule and risk to Lunar Swingby, but did not ultimately adversely affect
either mission (see section IV.B). Data from Lunar Swingby were instrumental in detecting issues with image
compression (see section V.F) and exposure settings. Changes to payload command sequences and operational
procedures stemming from these findings were critical to the success of impact observations.
C. Cruise Phase
The bulk of the LCROSS flight was spent in Cruise Phase, which began at the conclusion of Lunar Swingby, and
ended at TCM 8, just 9 days before lunar impact. The LGALRO was designed to have LCROSS re-encounter the
moon after three revolutions about the Earth, each of roughly 36 days. Under idealized trajectory planning, Cruise
Phase entailed only one TCM to target desired impact position, geometry, and timing parameters. However, the
mission plan incorporated additional TCM’s to correct errors stemming from the lunar gravity assist and subsequent
TCM’s; to compensate for unmodeled orbit perturbations; and to respond to in-flight refinements of the target
Centaur impact site*** . Cruise Phase also presented opportunities for additional payload calibrations and dictated
several engineering events, including periodic spacecraft reorientations to re-point the primary omni-directional
antenna toward Earth, activities to remove ice from the Centaur exterior, and additional checkout activities. After
the operational intensity of Transfer Phase, Cruise Phase was designed to scale back on DSN contacts to an average
of one track of 4 to 6 hours duration every three days, greatly reducing the staffing required to support the mission.
The early part of the first Cruise orbit was devoted to transitioning to intermittent DSN coverage. Importantly,
the anomalous thruster thermal behavior discovered early in Transfer Phase (section V.B) required in-flight
modifications to onboard fault management, ground command sequences, and operational procedures before the
flight team was comfortable leaving the spacecraft unmonitored for long periods. Post-Lunar Swingby trajectory
errors were too small to justify executing the planned TCM 4a and 4b maneuvers. The first Cruise TCM executed
was TCM 5a, the second and final deterministic burn for the mission, conducted on Day 33. TCM 5a was executed
very accurately, enabling the team to skip TCM 5b, TCM 5c, and TCM 6 on subsequent revolutions.
On Day 26, before TCM 5a, LCROSS conducted its first “Cold Side Bake” event in an attempt to remove ice
from the Centaur exterior (section V.D and Table 2). A second Cold Side Bake event was added to the schedule and
executed 15 days later. Dissatisfactory results from this second attempt ultimately justified the insertion of yet
another bakeout event during the second Cruise Phase orbit.
The second Cruise Phase orbit presented two opportunities for science instrument calibrations. The first, “Earth
Look 1”, swept the instrument boresights across the Earth disk on Day 45 for enhanced camera alignment
calibration and spectral calibrations on a well-understood target. The second opportunity, executed on Day 60, was
identified after launch, and enabled a simultaneous view of the crescent Earth and moon. This “Earth/Moon Look
Calibration” was added to test approaches for removing MIR2 instrument blur, which was noticed during previous
calibrations, possibly due to slippage of the lens during launch. Both calibration events executed nominally and
provided additional data to guide refinements to the impact sampling strategy.
On the second half of the second Earth orbit, as discovered immediately before the scheduled third Cold Side
Bake event, LCROSS experienced a major propellant loss stemming from a short-lived IRU glitch (see section V.E).
With the mission in jeopardy, LCROSS declared an emergency and transitioned to maximum DSN coverage to
enable full-time monitoring. Over the following two weeks, the flight team worked to develop strategies to prevent
another excessive propellant usage. With operational and software protections in place, the LCROSS project
returned to a nominal operational posture on Day 78, albeit with a significantly smaller propellant margin.
During the third and final Earth orbit, all activities were focused on preparations for impact. For training
purposes, the team conducted a series of nominal and contingency rehearsals of the final day’s activities, interleaved
with actual spacecraft monitoring and activity support. Earth Look Calibration 2 and Moon Look Calibration, both
scheduled for the final orbit, were victims of propellant-saving measures and cancelled. However, a reduced-scope
“Earth Gaze Calibration”, designed to use far less propellant at the expense of some science return, was added and
performed on Day 92. Its purpose was to re-confirm the operability of all instruments prior to impact.
Having cancelled the third Cold Side Bakeout due to the propellant loss, a replacement was planned and
executed on Day 98 (see Table 2). In a propellant-saving measure, and owing to coincidentally ideal geometry, this
activity was combined with the first on-orbit test of the minus-Z axis Medium Gain Antenna (MGA), the antenna
designated for the impact data downlink. The MGA test was successful; bakeout results were inconclusive.
*** In anticipation of late-arriving lunar data from LRO and other lunar missions, the LCROSS mission design
allowed the Science Team to select the final impact target within 30 days of impact without significant penalty.
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In the final two weeks of flight, the Science Team made two refinements of the impact target position: before
TCM 7 (A=97 km), and between TCM 8 and 9 (A=9.2 km). Each update resulted in changes to the following burn
plan to remove the remaining position error. TCM 7 (Day 99) and 8 (Day 104) were executed nominally to remove
estimated pre-burn impact position errors of roughly 520 km and 44 km, respectively.
D. Final Targeting and Impact Phase
To support precise navigation and burn planning prior to impact, this phase re-introduced 24-hour DSN tracking,
and added tracking performed by the Applied Physics Laboratory. TCM 9 and 10 remained in the mission plan to
refine the impact position and time of the Centaur impact. TCM 9 was designed to remove the error (9 km)
introduced primarily by the change in target position; it executed nominally (Day 111), reducing the predicted
impact error to 950 m (requiring a correction of 15 cm/s). The maneuver design team determined that the delta-v
induced by separation could be used to precisely nudge the Centaur into the desired impact trajectory. Consequently,
the team waived TCM 10, avoiding the added complexity and greater performance uncertainty of another burn.
Centaur separation was performed successfully 9 hours 40 minutes prior to Centaur impact and, with the
substantial change of mass properties, was accompanied by a transition to a completely new set of attitude control
modes tuned for post-separation conditions (and untested in flight). One minute following separation, the S-S/C
flipped 180 degrees to point the payload at the receding Centaur. The spacecraft payload was activated to transmit
imagery of the Centaur for 15 minutes (via 70 m DSN antenna), to determine whether the separation had caused the
Centaur to tumble. Forty minutes after separation, the S-S/C performed the Braking Burn, a delta-v maneuver used
to induce a four-minute delay between the Centaur and S-S/C impact events (598 km range at Centaur impact).
I Centaur	 LCROSS I	 I +J	 -
Impact	 Impact	 L'
Figure 2. Impact Science Observations. The left diagram is a timeline of instrument data collection covering
the five minutes prior to S-S/C impact. Label `A” shows downlink fully subscribed; `B” shows irregular ticks
that reflect images dropped onboard due to downlink over-subscription; `C” shows the effect of a ground
command sent to reduce camera sampling rates; `D” shows how a command sent to change an image exposure
setting enabled imaging the Centaur crater in near-infrared. The right image is the NSP 1 field-of-view just after
Centaur impact.
The flight team re-planned the impact sequence using post-burn orbit estimates. In the hours before Centaur
impact, the team disabled a large fraction of onboard fault management to prevent faults from interrupting impact
observations, and acquired the 70 m and two 34 m antennas at Goldstone (downlink via MGA at 1 Mbps). The
impact command sequence steered the S-S/C attitude to keep the payload boresight pointing toward the intended
Centaur impact point while pointing the MGA toward Earth, under an ACS mode that enforced a 0.1 deg deadband.
The payload was activated a final time 56 minutes prior to Centaur impact, during which the science and payload
team confirmed payload operability, including the only in-flight power-up of the total luminescence photometer.
Impact observations were divided into three phases: Flash, Curtain, and Crater. Figure 2 depicts the data return
from each science instrument (one row for each; one tick for each image or spectrum) during the final five minutes
of flight. Flash Phase, which began one minute prior to the expected Centaur impact time, was designed to capture
the light released at impact. The nadir-looking near-infrared spectrometer (NSP1) was commanded to a high speed,
low spectral resolution mode (shown in yellow). The mid-infrared cameras (MIR1/2) were triggered to observe the
impact in one image each, while the total luminescence photometer sampled at 1000 Hz. Curtain Phase, designed to
capture the evolution of the ejecta cloud, emphasized recording near-infrared and ultraviolet/visible spectra (NSP1
and VSP instruments respectively). Crater Phase emphasized imaging the Centaur crater with thermal cameras
(MIR1/2). The image at the right of Figure 2 shows the NSP1 field of view (pre- and post-Lunar Swingby alignment
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estimates), superimposed on an image of Cabeus. The green dot is the estimated location of the Centaur impact from
thermal imagery taken seconds before S-S/C impact. Image compression artifacts (see section V.F) are visible in the
lower left. Pre-publication estimates place the terrain-relative Centaur impact position error at 75 m ± 82 m.
III. Pre-Launch and In-Flight Mission Planning
Trajectory and maneuver planning to achieve a precise impact was a particularly challenging aspect of the
mission. The problem balanced meeting very specific impact and observation conditions against the limitations of
the spacecraft – perhaps most importantly its finite propellant load. A complex design cycle and several launch date
slips made this an exceptionally work-intensive part of LCROSS development. In flight, a number of natural and
self-induced orbit perturbations counteracted efforts to achieve precision. As so much was being learned about the
lunar poles even after launch, the impact target was re-specified repeatedly until 9 days before impact.
A. Impact Requirements
LCROSS satisfied numerous requirements governing the accuracy, geometry and timing of its impact, including:
1) To enable impact at either lunar pole (latitudes > 70 deg) with a targeting accuracy goal of +/-1.75 km;
2) To achieve an impact angle (between the impact velocity vector and the crater floor) of no less than 60 deg,
but as close to 90 deg as possible to maximize the height of the impact plume;
3) To impact the moon at a time such that a) the moon was oriented to tilt the impact point surface normal
toward the Sun (to maximize lighting of the ejecta) and Earth (to maximize visibility from Earth); b) the
moon phase was more than 30 deg from new moon or full moon; c) the moon was simultaneously visible
from the DSN, Hawaii, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) and LRO, and d) the prime observatory in
Hawaii was in nighttime conditions with a minimum of two hours after dusk and before dawn.
Within a month of impact, the final
selection of the impact site was made, with
a target chosen deep inside Cabeus crater
(lon 311.302 deg, lat -84.674 deg in lunar
Mean Earth rotating coordinates). While
this choice of impact target increased the
likelihood of detecting water by LCROSS,
the depth of the site (3.8 km below the
mean lunar radius) made it more difficult
for Earth-based observatories to acquire
measurements of the impact plume. The
final LCROSS impact time (10/9/09
11:31:19 UTC) was set in the final weeks
and days prior to impact to permit optimal
on-orbit observations from HST, and the
LRO spacecraft coordinated a series of
orbit maneuvers that allowed LRO to fly
by the impact site shortly after impact.
Figure 3. LCROSS Trajectory. In mission planning, varying the
B. Trajectory Design Strategy 	 flyby direction and number of Earth revolutions provided flexibility
LCROSS was required to minimally to meet the impact requirements. As flown, the mission combined a
affect the LRO mission as a precondition south pole lunar flyby and three revolutions about Earth prior to a
to its selection as a secondary mission. south pole impact (as shown above).
This necessitated that LCROSS be able to accommodate as many candidate LRO launch dates as possible. Given
the above strict requirements, trajectories with variable mission durations had to be devised that could be phased
with lunar libration cycles. The solution was to permit either south or north pole lunar gravity assists (governing
whether impact occurred on an even number of moon revolutions after Lunar Swingby), to vary the lunar fly-by
altitudes, and to vary the total number of Earth revolutions in order to establish the necessary LGALRO phasing
trajectories. These trajectories resulted in Cruise Phase orbits with perigee at lunar distance and apogee set at
varying distances that could sustain a sufficient number of revolutions about the Earth and impact the desired lunar
pole during windows of opportunity that satisfied LCROSS impact requirements. Trajectories requiring between 2
to 5.5 revolutions of the Earth (with corresponding mission durations of 2.5 to 7 months) were designed to supported
each of the 3-4 day LRO launch blocks that occurred every two weeks between April and July 2009.
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Per agreement with United Launch Alliance (ULA), LCROSS could rely on up to 50 m/s of delta-v from the
launch vehicle (following LRO separation) to help target its desired fly-by conditions. Since the launch vehicle
injection burn targeted an LRO lunar insertion over the south pole (~350 km altitude), LCROSS trajectories that
required a south pole Lunar Swingby could be directly targeted by the launch vehicle. For LCROSS trajectories
requiring a north pole Lunar Swingby, the 50 m/s launch vehicle contribution needed to be supplemented by a
deterministic LCROSS maneuver (TCM 1) to complete the placement of periselene several thousand kilometers
over the north pole.
At the time of final delivery of LCROSS launch targeting states to ULA, a north pole impact was baselined by
the LCROSS science team. However, in April 2009, newly obtained lunar observation data prompted the science
team to request a switch to a south pole impact. For the June 18 launch date, the change involved retargeting from a
3.5-month south pole swingby trajectory with a north pole impact to a 4-month south pole swingby trajectory with a
south pole impact. Since in both cases a south pole swingby was required, a deterministic LCROSS maneuver of
only 6 m/s was needed to retarget the desired fly-by conditions.
C. Orbit Perturbations and a Moving Target
Trajectory planning was complicated by numerous natural orbit perturbations, including solar radiation pressure
and accelerations induced by the sublimation of ice from the Centaur (see section V.D). Other perturbations were
self-induced. Attitude control was performed exclusively via thrusters. Despite a design that “balanced” thruster
firings to minimize orbit effects, second-order effects were still significant. Furthermore, for greater propellant
efficiency, the team resorted to paired (unbalanced) thruster firings in response to the propellant demands of a
Centaur gas leak and the propellant loss caused by an in-flight anomaly (detailed in sections V.A and V.E,
respectively).
Knowledge of the impact target region on the lunar south pole increased dramatically during flight. Other active
missions (Kaguya, Chandrayaan-1, and especially LRO) produced a host of data relating to suspected water
concentration, crater depth (and view angle to Earth) and topography that transformed the LCROSS science team’s
targeting strategy. The LCROSS impact target was changed four times in flight, the last only 9 days before impact,
following TCM 8. Each target update entailed maneuver re-planning, adding to the team’s workload.
IV. Co-Manifestation and Concurrent Flight with LRO
Beyond sharing the ride to space, co-manifestation with LRO on the Atlas V launch vehicle had an enormous
influence on LCROSS. Though LRO imposed strict limitations on the LCROSS design and partially restricted its
use of the DSN in the first week of operations, the LRO team provided invaluable support to LCROSS for impact
site selection and conducted pre- and post-impact observations in support of the LCROSS science mission. The
close collaboration that began between the two teams during spacecraft development continued successfully in
mission planning and in flight.
A. Power-Off Launch and Activation
As a secondary payload launching with LRO, LCROSS, with its risk-tolerant Class D posture, was required to
follow a policy of non-interference with the LRO mission that governed many aspects of the LCROSS program and
spacecraft design. Operationally, this policy manifested itself in the design of LCROSS to be powered off while
attached to LRO and to be activated autonomously after LRO separation. This requirement added a degree of
complexity to the LCROSS spacecraft and operational designs.
On the launch pad, a minimal set of LCROSS telemetry, including battery voltages and the states of relays
critical to spacecraft activation, was available to the launch site engineering support team via a data umbilical.
These were a focus of launch commit criteria to prevent launching a malfunctioning LCROSS. At liftoff the
umbilical was severed, leaving the flight team without spacecraft health data during ascent.
Section II.A describes the operations surrounding S-S/C activation. The S-S/C activation sequence, implemented
in the Autonomy & Fault Management subsystem, shared many of the same command sequences designed to place
LCROSS into its “safe mode.” It was designed to power the spacecraft and to place it in a benign configuration,
without human intervention. The fault management design, and the flight team procedures to monitor them, evolved
over many months and required significant testing and training.
B. DSN Resource Contention and Resolution
Following LRO separation, LCROSS and LRO maintained very similar moon-bound trajectories and shared the
DSN as a primary communications network for critical events. LRO no longer imposed its non-interference
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requirement on LCROSS, and the two were treated as independent missions. Prior to launch, the two projects
coordinated closely to resolve periods of DSN contention that were anticipated during their simultaneous transfers
and lunar encounters. Based on technical discussions and considering event criticality for each mission, LRO
updated the timing for its first Mid-Course Correction (MCC 1) to allow LCROSS to perform its first TCM as
originally scheduled, with dual DSN antenna coverage. However, the criticality of LRO’s Lunar Orbit Insertion
burn (as compared to the LCROSS Lunar Swingby event, which was highly important but not mission-critical),
prompted the teams to design a detailed DSN antenna handoff plan (different for each launch time) that would
ensure the greatest chance of LOI success, while providing sufficient DSN coverage of LCROSS’s Lunar Swingby
in most cases. It is worth mentioning that in some scenarios, including for the actual launch date, the success of the
Lunar Swingby hinged on the earlier success of the LRO LOI. In practice, the plan for the June 18 21:32 launch
time provided DSN uplink and downlink time for LCROSS to upload commands for Lunar Swingby prior to the
LRO LOI, and to capture all data from Swingby after the LOI, albeit at a higher-than-desired observation altitude.
C. LRO Support of LCROSS Target Selection and Impact Observation
The LRO team afforded LCROSS a tremendous advantage when it conducted a series of lunar south pole
overflights and provided the project with data that was critical to the in-flight selection of the impact site. Perhaps
more importantly, the selection of Cabeus as the impact site reduced the viability of using Earth-based observatories
in support of plume detection and analysis. As a consequence, data taken on LRO’s overflight of the LCROSS
impact site after the Centaur impact became the only strong supplemental evidence in the discovery of water.
V. Anomalies and Surprises
The LCROSS team experienced a number of flight system anomalies and unexpected behaviors during the
mission, but either fully recovered from them or significantly reduced their associated risk by introducing system
modifications and operational workarounds. The following sections describe the detection and responses for six
noteworthy off-nominal conditions.
A. Centaur Gas Leak
Analysis of the Centaur provided by ULA in the months before launch exposed a potential for residual
propellants to leak from one or more valves on the spent stage for weeks following launch. Leaking gasses were
predicted to induce a torque on the LCROSS stack which would be counteracted by S-S/C attitude control.
Depending on the torque direction, magnitude and dissipation profile (as a function of the quantity of trapped
propellants, the valve location, the leak rate, and leak effective thrust parameters), analysis showed that the resulting
LCROSS propellant usage could range from inconsequential to catastrophic (>100 kg/day). In the weeks
immediately prior to launch, the LCROSS project developed operational strategies for assessing leak severity and
counteracting leak effects to the degree possible. Furthermore, at the LPRP program level, the risk posed to the
LCROSS mission by the Centaur leak (and the minimal time to respond to the information) influenced the decision
to slip the LRO/LCROSS launch from the June 2 to the June 17 launch block (much higher propellant margin).
In the first day of flight, the team performed two torque observations, each three to four minutes long, during
which attitude control was disabled to permit an observation of the attitude time history without thruster firings.
These data were used to estimate the torques being experienced by the spacecraft. The flight team also observed the
deadband behavior while under control and estimated propellant usage due to attitude control thruster firings. The
team concluded that Centaur gasses were inducing a significant torque on the combined stack. On Day 1, LCROSS
exhibited ACS propellant usage of approximately 6.5 kg/day (>10 times the predicted non-leak value). To minimize
propellant usage, the team configured the spacecraft to fire thrusters in pairs instead of nominal quads. This
removed the cancellation effect of balanced four-thruster sets, but caused all ACS firings to perturb the LCROSS
orbit. The team also increased the ACS impulse bit from 50 ms to 100 ms, thereby improving the effective specific
impulse for typically short thruster firings. Over the flight, the torque direction changed, occasionally in inexplicable
discrete jumps. Because these effects were only indirectly observed, it was never determined which Centaur valves
may have been leaking, or whether there were other effects in play (e.g. ice sublimation from Centaur skin).
Propellant usage for background ACS shrank to below 1.0 kg/day in the first week and to 0.25 kg/day by mid-
mission. The propellant margin associated with the June 18 launch date was sufficient to absorb this cost.
B. Thruster Thermal Control
On Day 1 of the flight, spacecraft engineers observed that valve heaters for two 5N thrusters were not activating
at the measured valve low-temperature thresholds, thereby risking hydrazine freezing and propellant line rupture.
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Table 2. Summary of Cold Side Bakeout Maneuvers
Maneuver Plan Outline Notes
Cold Side Bake 1 40 minute roll to 180°; Expected ~1 cm/s delta-v;
60 minute dwell Observed 3.4 cm/s
40 minute roll to 360°
Cold Side Bake 2 10 minute roll to 180°; Observed ~1.13 cm/s delta-v;
100 minute dwell Significant reduction from
10 minute roll to 360° acceleration seen in CSB 1
Cold Side Bake 3 30 minute roll to 135° Combined with –Z MGA test;
20 minute dwell Similar behavior to CSB 2;
25 minute roll to 225°; Results inconclusive due to poor
20 minute dwell Doppler geometry
30 minute roll to 360°
LCROSS thruster valve heaters were controlled via fixed-setpoint thermostats attached to the thruster mounting
brackets. The flight team later determined the cause to be a combination of insufficient thermal conductivity
between the thruster valves and thermostats and excessive thermal conductivity between the thermostats and thruster
nozzles and catalyst bed heaters. Cold thruster valve temperatures were not perceived by the thermostats, which
were being warmed by repeated thruster firings and constant heat from the catalyst beds. The potential for this
condition was discovered during spacecraft thermal vacuum testing and partially mitigated. However, due to project
limitations, the problem could not be fully re-analyzed or re-tested until flight.
The operational effects of this anomaly were significant. Without direct control of thruster valve heaters, the
flight team spent the first several days enacting various measures to warm the valves, including ground-commanding
thruster firings, biasing the spacecraft attitude to warm the valves via direct exposure to sunlight, and brief entry to
small deadband control submodes to induce frequent thruster firings. Despite their short-term warming benefit,
frequent thruster firings, induced partially by the Centaur gas leak (see above), prevented the thruster brackets from
reaching thermal equilibrium with the thruster valves. The final mitigation strategy combined modifications to
operational practice and to fault management software tables. First, the LCROSS Cruise attitude was modified by
adding a minus 20 degree bias in yaw such that the offending thruster valves were warmed by direct sun exposure.
Second, onboard fault management was augmented to automatically trigger short sequences of thruster firings upon
reaching the low valve temperature thresholds. The yaw bias was sufficient to control valve temperatures in all but
a few specific cases, and hence the thermal issue did not become a burden on propellant. By experiment, the yaw
bias was deemed necessary to control valve temperatures, and it was used until just before impact.
C. Transponder Doppler Bias
On the first day of flight, the Navigation team noticed a distinct 0.7 Hz bias in Doppler measurements below a
specific signal frequency. This corrupted tracking measurements and prevented accurate estimates of the LCROSS
trajectory, critical to precision targeting for full mission success. This problem was later attributed to a coding error
in an FPGA within the transponder unit and not repairable in flight. To work around the issue, LCROSS requested
that the DSN increase their uplink frequency by 5 kHz, thereby biasing the frequency above the threshold at which
problems had occurred. This removed the perceived Doppler bias and all negative effects on orbit estimation.
D. Centaur Ice Accumulation
By design, LCROSS flew with
its solar array pointed toward the sun
for most of the mission. Pre-launch
analysis anticipated that ice, which
had accumulated on the Centaur
after fueling on the pad, might
remain on the “cold side” of the
Centaur for most of flight, and
possibly through lunar impact. There
was some concern that residual
water ice might interfere with
measurements of water ice at the
impact site. More significantly, analysis predicted that a sufficient load of water ice on the Centaur exterior, sunlit
during its final lunar approach, might push the Centaur off course by hundreds of meters due to sublimation.
Prior to launch, the flight team prepared procedures and command sequences to perform a single “Cold Side
Bakeout” maneuver, during which the S-S/C (and Centaur) would be rotated 180 degrees about its longitudinal (roll)
axis to face the cold side to the sun as a means of forcing early sublimation of any remaining volatiles. In flight, the
execution of this maneuver resulted in an unexpectedly large signature of escaping volatiles (as measured by
Doppler shift; see Table 2). A second maneuver exposed the cold side of the Centaur for a longer duration, yet
yielded a lesser (but still concerning) signature. A third maneuver seemed to yield similar outgassing, but suffered
from poor monitoring geometry. Due to insufficient propellant reserves and time remaining in the mission, the team
abandoned further attempts. Pre-impact analysis predicted an impact position error of up to 400 m (anti-sun
direction) due to sublimation; post-impact analysis remains inconclusive.
E. IRU Fault and Excessive Propellant Usage
On Day 65, upon reacquiring communications with LCROSS after a planned 66 hours out of view, the flight
team discovered LCROSS in a backup attitude control configuration. Its IRU was off-line, the star tracker assembly
10
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(STA) was providing attitude rate information to the ACS, and thrusters were firing nearly continuously. In roughly
24 hours, LCROSS had expended nearly 152 kg of its remaining 202 kg of propellant. The project declared an
emergency and remained in a full anomaly resolution and recovery posture for two weeks. The propellant loss, it
was later determined, was caused by a chain of problems. Roughly 24 hours prior to the anomaly discovery, for
reasons not explained (but possibly attributable to a single-event upset), the IRU indicated a fault condition for 5 ms.
The fault was detected by ACS fault management and interpreted as an IRU failure. To sustain control, the ACS
switched to the STA for attitude rate information. STA-derived rates contained far more noise than those from the
IRU, but the ACS was not equipped with STA noise filtering. The noise was interpreted as actual rate information,
triggering nearly continuous thruster firing to maintain control. Aside from the short-lived fault condition, the IRU
remained fully operational; returning the ACS to IRU-derived rates returned LCROSS to its pre-anomaly ACS
propellant consumption rate.
The flight team developed a multi-faceted strategy to protect LCROSS from a similar anomaly as well as from
any other anomaly that might cause excessive propellant usage. Onboard fault management was modified to switch
to STA backup only in the event of a persistent IRU fault condition. The ACS Stellar Inertial Mode was re-designed
to drastically reduce propellant consumption under STA rates, and to be more efficient under IRU rates. To prevent
general excessive propellant usage, fault management was also augmented to detect excessive propellant usage, and
to respond by transitioning into a modified version of Sun Point Mode (the LCROSS safe mode) that would induce a
high yaw rate to make LCROSS passively stable, and then disable attitude control to cease propellant usage.
Following the anomaly, analysis determined that sufficient propellant remained to reliably meet all mission
objectives, but only by engaging in propellant-saving measures for the remainder of the mission. Two science
calibrations, Earth Look 2 and Moon Look, were removed from the schedule, other activities were merged to take
advantage of propellant-saving synergies, and the spacecraft was returned to using paired thruster firings for control
(developed originally to counter propellant usage for the Centaur gas leak).
F. Image Compression and Payload Bandwidth
During the Lunar Swingby Calibration, payload engineers observed that onboard algorithms to compress images
of the lunar surface were less effective than during ground-based tests. The team attributed the phenomenon to
greater scene complexity in actual images, causing degradation in compression performance. Stemming from this
discovery, the Science Team reduced the image sampling frequencies set by impact instrument command sequences,
in order to fit within the downlink data rate allowance with worse-than-expected compression ratios. Operationally,
contingency ground procedures were developed to quickly update camera sampling rates in near real-time.
During the final lunar approach, image compression performed even less well than for Lunar Swingby.
Following from operational modifications, the Science Team made on-the-fly requests to reduce camera sampling
rates in the midst of Impact Phase data collection to prevent DHU oversubscription.
VI. Conclusions
The LCROSS mission was faced with many challenges. Late-breaking predictions of possible Centaur gas leaks
forced the operations team to revise or newly develop and test broad-reaching procedures and command sequences
in the weeks prior to launch. Strict impact targeting precision requirements were made more challenging under the
many perturbations to the LCROSS orbit, including from the spacecraft’s own ACS thruster firings and volatiles
escaping from the ice-laden Centaur exterior. LCROSS experienced two challenges to propellant reserves - a
persistent Centaur gas leak and a propellant-intensive response to a very brief IRU fault. The LCROSS mission
operations team, only barely large enough to staff the busy first week of flight, was taxed further by a series of
anomalies that, while recoverable, stretched working hours well beyond original expectations.
Despite these hurdles, the LCROSS mission ended successfully. With any space mission, there is a certain
amount of luck necessary for success, and LCROSS was no different in that regard. Luck aside, several features of
LCROSS spacecraft and mission design contributed directly to mission success. The decision to slip the
LRO/LCROSS launch to the June 17 launch block, with its relatively low delta-v requirement (and high propellant
margin), was critical to mission success under the IRU fault response anomaly. The large S-S/C power margin,
which remained power-positive even under sustained solar array sun angles of 60 degrees, was important to the
workaround developed for the thruster thermal anomaly, which was possible only by maintaining a 20 degree sun
angle bias for most of the mission. Though the Centaur gas leak was not as serious as some models predicted, the
operational workarounds developed prior to launch became central elements of the propellant savings strategy
imposed after the IRU anomaly.
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Flight team training and composition also contributed to mission success. With exclusive use of an accurate
LCROSS spacecraft simulator for more than a year prior to flight, the flight team trained extensively in nearly every
aspect of the LCROSS mission. By launch, the team was largely accustomed to the operational flow and could focus
its attention on the unexpected challenges presented by the real spacecraft.
We also attribute the LCROSS success to an array of formal and informal partnerships. When anomalies
occurred, the flight team included in its membership numerous Northrop Grumman lead spacecraft subsystem
engineers and systems engineers, all of whom had been deeply involved in the design and test of the spacecraft.
Strong management relationships built between NASA Ames and Northrop Grumman during spacecraft
development continued during flight. As a result of this close partnership, the team transitioned efficiently between
nominal and anomaly response postures. Impact targeting benefitted tremendously from the expertise provided by
JPL (navigation and link scheduling) and GSFC (maneuver design). On another level, the partnership between
LCROSS and LRO teams was extremely valuable to LCROSS. LRO provided critical directed data for impact site
selection and supported impact science operations with its observations of the Centaur impact site. Informal
partnerships with other mission teams, including Kaguya and Chandrayaan-1, were instrumental in impact site
selection. Though never brought into full service, the Goddard Network coordinated with LCROSS in an effort to
provide the project with additional communications contact time in the sensitive period after the propellant loss.
APL provided valuable tracking data to augment data from the DSN prior to impact. Finally, through the generosity
of numerous other missions communicating via the DSN, who sacrificed significant scheduled track time during the
IRU fault and subsequent emergency declaration, the LCROSS mission operations team was able to maintain a 24-
hour communications link to the S-S/C until sufficient fault management products could be developed, tested, and
loaded on board.
Appendix A: Acronym List
ACS attitude control system LRO Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter
ARC NASA Ames Research Center MCC mid-course correction (LRO)
EDUS Earth Departure Upper Stage (Centaur) MIR Mid-Infrared Camera
ESPA EELV Secondary Payload Adapter NIR Near-Infrared Camera
DHU Data Handling Unit NSP Near-Infrared Spectrometer
DSN Deep Space Network S-S/C LCROSS Shepherding Spacecraft
HST Hubble Space Telescope STA star tracker assembly
IRU inertial reference unit TCM trajectory correction maneuver (LCROSS)
LCROSS Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing
Satellite
TLI trans-lunar injection
LGALRO lunar gravity assist lunar return orbit VSP Visible Spectrometer
LOI lunar orbit insertion ULA United Launch Alliance
LPRP Lunar Precursor Robotic Program UTC Universal Coordinated Time
Appendix B: Glossary
blowdown Condition in which propellant is pressurized only by residual propellant in system and
mechanical pressure regulators (e.g. bladder)
Chandrayaan-1 A mission operated by the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to collect global lunar
topographic, chemical, and mineralogical data. Launched 22 October 2008.
Kaguya Known officially as SELENE (Selenelogical and Engineering Explorer), a mission operated by
the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) to collect lunar geologic, topographic,
and gravity field data. Launched 14 September 2007.
periselene Closest approach to moon
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